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Judge Hutchinson heard argument of this appeal and participated
in its decision. However, Judge Hutchinson died before this
opinion was filed.
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Thomas S. Williamson, Jr.
Donald S. Shire
Christian P. Barber
C. William Mangum (Argued)
Suite N-2605
United States Department of Labor
Office of the Solicitor
200 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20210
Attorneys for Respondent
---------OPINION OF THE COURT
---------GARTH, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Salvadore Plesh, a retired miner, petitions for
review of an order entered by the Benefits Review Board (BRB) of
the United States Department of Labor (DOL).

The BRB upheld the

decision of the DOL administrative law judge (ALJ) who terminated
Plesh's benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C.
§901 et seq. (BLBA).

We conclude that the BRB erred in

terminating Plesh's benefits and we will therefore reverse.
I.
Born on May 28, 1917, Plesh began working in a coal mine in
1943, for the Lehigh Valley Coal Company in Hazelton, Pennsylvania.

Plesh worked for more than seventeen years, from 1943 to

1960, in underground mines and later in strip mines as a rock and
coal driller.

Plesh testified that he left the coal mines after

he began to feel ill and his doctor advised him to discontinue

2

coal mine employment.

After abandoning coal mine work, Plesh

worked as a janitor, a nightwatchman and a mail sorter.
Plesh first filed a claim for benefits under the BLBA on May
29, 1979.0

This application was governed by the guidelines set

forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 727, which provide certain presumptions
in favor of the miner.

On March 29, 1980, the Director awarded

benefits and began making monthly payments retroactive to May
1979.
More than six years later, on September 16, 1986, the
Director sent a letter to Plesh informing him that a recent
review of Plesh's claim file revealed "certain deficiencies." The
letter requested that Plesh provide "[m]edical information
showing the condition of your lungs" and "[d]ocuments to
establish your relationship to any dependents."

The letter

further instructed Plesh to "undergo a complete set of medical
tests at [DOL] expense."
Plesh underwent the required medical testing.

On November

6, 1986, Dr. Leo Corazza examined Plesh, performed a chest x-ray,
and conducted a pulmonary function study (PFS) and an arterial
blood gas study (BGS).

Dr. Corazza found that the x-ray

"demonstrate[d] no evidence of pneumoconiosis."

0

Jt. App. 377.

In connection with his application for black lung benefits,
Plesh was examined by Dr. Harold Silver on December 21, 1979 and
by Dr. Roscoe C. Young on April 29, 1980. Dr. Silver diagnosed
chronic bronchitis but opined that the condition was unrelated to
coal mine employment. Dr. Young reported that a chest x-ray
showed evidence of pneumoconiosis and that a pulmonary function
study indicated a moderately severe restrictive ventilatory
defect. Dr. Young diagnosed early simple coal workers'
pneumoconiosis and moderate restrictive respiratory disability.
3

Dr. Stanley Laucks and Dr. W.S. Cole, both "B-readers,"0 reread
the x-ray and concluded that it was negative for pneumoconiosis.
Dr. Corazza found that the BGS results were within normal
limits but noted that the PFS results were "compatible with the
diagnosis of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, moderately
severe."

Jt. App. 380.

Based on his examination of Plesh, Dr.

Corazza diagnosed chronic bronchitis, pulmonary emphysema and
ankle edema (of unknown etiology).

Dr. Corazza also opined,

without explanation, that Plesh's condition was not related to
coal mine employment.
After conducting further PFS and BGS tests on January 14,
1987, Dr. Corazza observed a decrease in vital capacity
"compatible with the presence of some restrictive pulmonary
disease."

Jt. App. 367.

Dr. Corazza further opined that "[t]he

appearance of the spirogram0 [wa]s compatible with some degree of
obstructive disease."

Id.

The Director determined that the additional medical evidence
compiled by Dr. Corazza failed to establish that Plesh was
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis.

Consequently, on March

11, 1987, the Director issued an Order to Show Cause, which
directed Plesh to "show cause within thirty (30) days why the
original award should not be modified to reflect that eligibility
0

A "B reader" is a physician who has demonstrated proficiency in
reading x-rays for pneumoconiosis by passing annually an
examination established by the National Institute of Safety and
Health and administered by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(ii)(E); 42 C.F.R.
§37.51.
0
A spirogram is "a tracing or graph of respiratory movements."
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1563 (27th ed. 1988).
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shall cease effective April 1, 1987."

Jt. App. 360.

The Order

to Show Cause required Plesh to submit evidence showing that he
was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis caused by coal mine
employment.
Rather than complying with this mandate, Plesh returned the
Order with the following handwritten note on the last page of the
Order:
Dear Sir - I am appealing this as of now. Having went
to the Howard Hospital, for my Pulmonary Medical
Records and I was told they were sent to Mt. Sterling
KY Labor Dept - and having taken another exam at Dr.
Corrazza [sic] -- Now I am going to get another exam
and will give you further med. evidence of my health
for Black Lung after 26 years in coal mines. I will
send this to you as soon as possible - thank you
Sincerely yours
Salvadore Plesh
[Social Security number omitted]
P.S. Mr. Ratliff - this is the only means of survival
that my wife and I have to live on now - thank you.
Jt. App. 360-61 (emphasis added).

This letter was received by

the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWCP) on March 26, 1987. The
Director did not respond to Plesh's letter, but instead issued a
final order on April 28, 1987 terminating benefits, effective
April 1, 1987.

Plesh did not appeal this order.

Two years later, on April 13, 1989, Plesh submitted a new or
second claim for benefits.

On July 5, 1989, Dr. Philip Witorsch

examined Plesh, took x-rays, and conducted PFS and BGS tests.
Based on these tests, Dr. Witorsch diagnosed "chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease - chronic bronchitis . . . most likely due to
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[Plesh's] history of tobacco use."

Dr. Witorsch observed that

the "chest x-ray is consistent with simple coal workers'
pneumoconiosis."

Dr. Witorsch opined, however, that "[t]he

contribution, if any, of patient's coal mine employment to this
impairment is uncertain."

At the same time, Dr. Witorsch

recommended performing further tests, including a lateral x-ray,
lung volume test and an exercise study, to further evaluate
whether Plesh's respiratory impairment was attributable to coal
dust exposure.

Permission to perform these tests was denied.

The Director issued a Proposed Decision and Order Denying
Benefits on October 23, 1989.

In denying Plesh's claim, the

Director explained that because Plesh had filed his second claim
more than one year after the denial of his first claim, Plesh's
second claim would be treated as a duplicate claim under 20
C.F.R. § 725.3090 rather than as a request for modification under
20 C.F.R. § 725.310.0

The Director explained further that Plesh

0

Section 725.309, which is titled "Duplicate claims, provides in
part:
If an earlier claim subject to review under part 727 of
this subchapter has been denied after review, a new
claim filed under this part shall also be denied, on
the ground of the prior denial, unless the [Director]
determines that there has been a material change in
conditions or the later claim is a request for
modification and the requirements of § 725.310 are met.
20 C.F.R. § 725.309(c).
0
Section 725.310 provides in part:
Upon his or her own initiative, or upon the request of
any party on grounds of a change in conditions or
because of a mistake in a determination of fact, the
[Director] may, at any time before one year from the
date of the last payment of benefits, or at any time
before one year after the denial of a claim, reconsider
the terms of an award or denial of benefits.
20 C.F.R. §725.310(a).
6

had failed to establish "a material change in condition," a
necessary prerequisite to filing a duplicate claim.
Plesh appealed to the BRB, which remanded to the Office of
Administrative Law Judges pursuant to Lukman v. Director, OWCP,
896 F.2d 1248 (10th Cir. 1990).0

The ALJ concluded that Plesh's

March 26, 1987 letter, wherein Plesh declared "I am appealing
this as of now," constituted an effective appeal of the
Director's final order terminating Plesh's benefits.
Because Plesh filed his first claim for benefits before
April 1980, the ALJ first evaluated Plesh's claim under 20 C.F.R.
Part 727.

Part 727 provides for a rebuttable "interim"

presumption that a claimant with at least ten years of coal mine
employment is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis if the
claimant meets any one of the criteria set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§ 727.203(a).

The ALJ found that Plesh had satisfied the (a)(2)0

and (a)(4)0 requirements.

0

Previously, the BRB had required that duplicate claims be
appealed directly to the BRB rather than to an ALJ. Lukman v.
Director, OWCP, 10 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-56 (1987), aff'd on
recon., 11 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-71 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1988) (en
banc), rev'd, 896 F.2d 1248 (10th Cir. 1990). The Tenth Circuit
later reversed Lukman, holding that a claimant who filed a
duplicate claim had a right to a hearing before an ALJ. Lukman,
896 F.2d at 1254.
0
A claimant may invoke the interim presumption under subsection
(a)(2) if ventilatory studies produce values less than those
specified in the table incorporated into section 727.203(a)(2).
0
A claimant may invoke the interim presumption under subsection
(a)(4) if "[o]ther medical evidence, including the documented
opinion of a physician exercising reasoned medical judgment,
establishes the presence of a totally disabling respiratory or
pulmonary impairment." 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(4).
7

The ALJ further found, however, that the interim presumption
had been rebutted, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(3),0 by Dr.
Witorsch's testimony that Plesh's coal mine employment did not
significantly contribute to his disability.

The ALJ therefore

concluded that Plesh was not entitled to benefits under Part 727.
Relying on Caprini v. Director, OWCP, 824 F.2d 283 (3d Cir.
1987),0 the ALJ then proceeded to evaluate Plesh's claim under
the standards set forth in Part 718.

Part 718 requires that the

claimant bear the burden of proving (1) that he suffers from
pneumoconiosis; (2) that the disease arose out of coal mine
employment; and (3) that he is totally disabled due to
pneumoconiosis.

See 20 C.F.R. § 718.201-.204.

See also

Director, OWCP v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1320 (3d Cir. 1987).
The ALJ found that Plesh had established the first two prongs but
not the last prong (i.e. total disability).

Accordingly, the ALJ

denied benefits to Plesh.
The BRB, on appeal, held that Plesh had not timely appealed
the April 28, 1987 order and hence the ALJ had erred in applying
Part 727.

The BRB reasoned that the ALJ had improperly merged

Plesh's second claim with Plesh's first claim, and vacated the
ALJ's Part 727 findings.

0

A presumption established under subsection (a) may be rebutted
in one of several ways, including submission of "evidence [which]
establishes that the total disability or death of the miner did
not arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment
. . . ." 20 C.F.R. § 727(b)(3).
0
In Caprini, we held that where the claim was filed before March
31, 1980 but adjudicated after that date, the ALJ must evaluate
the claim under Part 718. 824 F.2d 283, 284 (3d Cir. 1987).
8

Turning to Plesh's second claim, the BRB held that Plesh, by
submitting new medical evidence, established a "material change
in conditions," as required by 20 C.F.R. § 725.309.
note 5.

See supra

The BRB, having decided that Part 727 was inapplicable

because Plesh's appeal was untimely, did not review the ALJ's
Part 727 findings, which it had vacated.

The BRB then concluded

that the ALJ's decision to deny benefits under Part 718 was
supported by substantial evidence.

Plesh filed a timely petition

for review of the BRB's decision.
II.
The BRB had jurisdiction to review the final order of an ALJ
granting or denying compensation benefits under section 21(b)(3)
of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"),
33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), as incorporated into the BLBA by 30 U.S.C.
§ 932(a).

See Elliot Coal Mining Co. v. Director, OWCP, 17 F.3d

616, 625 (3d Cir. 1994).

We have jurisdiction over an appeal

from the final order of the BRB under section 21(c) of the LHWCA,
33 U.S.C. § 921(c).

Id.

The BRB is bound by an ALJ's findings of fact "if they are
rational, supported by substantial evidence, and consistent with
applicable law."

Id. at 626.

See also 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), as

incorporated into the BLBA by 30 U.S.C. § 932(a); O'Keeffe v.
Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Assocs., 380 U.S. 359 (1965).

We review

the BRB's decision to ensure that the Board has accepted those
findings of the ALJ that are supported by substantial evidence.
Oravitz v. Director, OWCP, 843 F.2d 738, 739 (3d Cir. 1988).
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We

exercise plenary review over questions of law.

BethEnergy Mines,

Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 32 F.3d 844, 846 (3d Cir. 1994).
III.
We must first address the threshold issue of whether the
Director possessed authority to reopen and reconsider Plesh's
1980 award.

Plesh has challenged the validity of 20 C.F.R.

§ 718.404(b),0 which effectuates section 22 of the LHWCA, 33
U.S.C. § 922,0 and which is incorporated into the BLBA by 30
U.S.C. § 932(a).
Specifically, Plesh contends that Congress has acknowledged
that pneumoconiosis is an incurable, progressive disease, and
0

Section 718.404(b) provides:
An individual who has been finally adjudged to be
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis shall, if
requested to do so upon reasonable notice, where there
is an issue pertaining to the validity of the original
adjudication of disability, present himself or herself
for, and submit to, examinations or tests as provided
in § 718.101, and shall submit medical reports and
other evidence necessary for the purpose of determining
whether such individual continues to be under a
disability. Benefits shall cease as of the month in
which the miner is determined to be no longer eligible
for benefits.
0
Section 922 provides in relevant part:
Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of any
party in interest . . ., on the ground of a change in
conditions or because of a mistake in a determination
of fact by the [Director], the [Director] may, at any
time prior to one year after the date of the last
payment of compensation, whether or not a compensation
order has been issued, or at any time prior to one year
after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation
case . . . in accordance with the procedure prescribed
. . . and . . . issue a new compensation order which
may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or
decrease such compensation, or award compensation.
33 U.S.C. § 922.
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hence the Director may not withdraw benefits based upon the
premise that the claimant has recovered from the illness or that
the miner's disability has lessened.

Indeed, the Director has

conceded that a miner who is totally disabled by pneumoconiosis
will never recover, and the Secretary of the DOL has disavowed
authority to terminate or modify an award based upon recovery
from pneumoconiosis:
Although one comment praises [section 718.404], the
overwhelming majority of comments on this section
suggest that it be stricken. These comments note that
pneumoconiosis is a progressive disease, and that while
the symptoms may, on occasion, subside, the condition
itself does not improve. . . .
. . . In order to reflect the fact that the symptoms of
pneumoconiosis generally continue, even though
statutory entitlement may cease, the Department has
changed the title of this section from "cessation of
disability" to "cessation of entitlement." Although
the Department agrees that the disease does not
improve, section 22 of the [LHWCA] provides for
modification of awards on a change in condition or
mistake in determination of fact. Subsection (b) of
this regulation effectuates this provision.
45 Fed. Reg. 13,694 (Feb. 29, 1980) (emphasis added).
We agree that pneumoconiosis is progressive and incurable.
The legislative history of the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of
1977 clearly demonstrates that Congress recognized that coal dust
inhalation causes permanent damage.

See H.R. Rep. No. 95-151,

95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
237, 242.

In fact, the Supreme Court, this court and other

courts have recognized the irreversible nature of black lung
disease.

See Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135,

138 (1987); Shendock v. Director, OWCP, 893 F.2d 1458, 1467 n.10
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(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826 (1990); Kowalchick v.
Director, OWCP, 893 F.2d 615, 621 (3d Cir. 1990); Back v.
Director, OWCP, 796 F.2d 169, 172 (6th Cir. 1986); Orange v.
Island Creek Coal Co., 786 F.2d 724, 727 (6th Cir. 1986);
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Chubb, 741 F.2d 968, 973 (7th Cir.
1984); Andryka v. Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 14 Black Lung
Rep. (MB) 1-34 (1990); Stanley v. Betty B Coal Co., 13 Black Lung
Rep. (MB) 1-72 (1990); Belcher v. Beth-Elkhorn Corp., 6 Black
Lung Rep. (MB) 1-1180 (1984).
The Director argues, however, that the regulation in
question, as well as the DOL's authority to reopen a case, does
not rely upon an assumption that the claimant's condition can
improve.

Rather, the Director posits that section 718.404(b),

consistent with the statute, authorizes the OWCP to reopen a case
only upon a finding of a mistake in the original determination or
of a change in condition other than recovery from pneumoconiosis.
Here, the record does not reveal the specific reasons that
the Director chose to reopen Plesh's file.

The Director's letter

to Plesh merely states that his file was "found to have certain
deficiencies."

This statement is equivocal as to the Director's

motivation for reopening Plesh's file.

Because our analysis as

to the timeliness of Plesh's appeal differs substantially from
that of the BRB's, we have no need to address the following two
issues, which were not explicitly discussed by either party in
their briefs.
First, neither party has informed us as to whether the
Director's initial failure to identify the particular "change in
12

[Plesh's] condition" or the Director's "mistake in determination
of fact" precludes a remand to enable the Director to make such a
finding.

See 33 U.S.C. § 922 and supra note 3.

Second, neither

party has informed us as to whether the Director, in claiming a
"change in condition" or a "mistake in determination of fact,"
bears the burden of proof or only a burden of production.
Accordingly, we do not find it necessary to remand for
further briefing because under our view of Plesh's appeal, we are
satisfied that his letter received by the Director on March 26,
1987, in which he stated "I am appealing this as of now," was
sufficient to effectively appeal the termination of his Part 727
benefits.

Moreover, holding as we do infra that Plesh's appeal

was timely and effective, our review of the ALJ's findings and
conclusions persuades us that substantial evidence existed of
Plesh's continuing pneumoconiosis and total disability --evidence
which has not been rebutted by the Director.
IV.
For claims filed before April 1, 1980, the DOL's "interim"
presumptions apply.
1979.

Plesh filed his initial claim on May 29,

Under the more liberal Part 727 standards, a presumption

of total disability due to pneumoconiosis is established if a
living claimant has worked for more than ten years as a miner and
meets at least one of four specified medical requirements.
20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(1)-(4).0
0

See

If the claimant successfully

Section 727.203(a) provides in relevant part:
A miner who engaged in coal mine employment for at
least 10 years will be presumed to be totally disabled
due to pneumoconiosis . . . arising out of [coal mine]
13

invokes an interim presumption, the Director bears the burden of
rebutting the presumption in one of four ways:
(1) The evidence establishes that the individual
is, in fact, doing his usual coal mine work or
comparable and gainful work . . .; or
(2) In light of all relevant evidence it is
established that the individual is able to do his usual
coal mine work or comparable and gainful work . . .; or
(3) The evidence establishes that the total
disability or death of the miner did not arise in whole
or in part out of coal mine employment; or
(4) The evidence establishes that the miner does
not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis.
Id. at § 727.203(b).
If a claimant "files more than one claim for benefits . . .,
the later claim shall be merged with the earlier claim for all
purposes if the earlier claim is still pending."

Id. at

§ 725.309(d); see also Tonelli v. Director, OWCP, 878 F.2d 1083,
1086-87 (8th Cir. 1989).

Plesh's claim was properly evaluated

under Part 727 because his first claim was still pending at the
employment, if one of the following medical
requirements is met:
(1) A chest roentgenogram (X-ray), biopsy, or
autopsy establishes the existence of pneumoconiosis
. . .;
(2) Ventilatory studies establish the presence of
a chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease . . . as
demonstrated by values which are equal to or less than
the values specified in the following table . . .;
(3) Blood gas studies which demonstrate the
presence of an impairment in the transfer of oxygen
from the lung alveoli to the blood as indicated by
values which are equal to or less than the values
specified in the following table . . .;
(4) Other medical evidence, including the
documented opinion of a physician exercising reasoned
medical judgment, establishes the presence of a totally
disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment . . . .
20 C.F.R. § 725.203(a)(1)-(4).
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time he filed his second claim.

Whether Plesh's first claim

would be considered still pending depends upon whether Plesh
effectively appealed the 1989 denial of benefits due under his
first claim.
The ALJ found that Plesh's handwritten letter, which was
received by the Director on March 26, 1987, and which was written
in response to the Order to Show Cause, was a proper appeal of
the order terminating benefits.

The BRB disagreed with the ALJ's

determination of this issue and vacated the ALJ's findings as to
the timeliness of Plesh's appeal and merger of Plesh's claims.
We first note that Plesh's message to the Director, although
terse and informal, clearly and unequivocally communicated
Plesh's intent to "appeal . . . as of now."

Under the

regulations, the Director must refer a claim to the Office of
Administrative Law Judges if a party requests a formal hearing,
which we deem Plesh's "letter-appeal" to have sought.

See 33

U.S.C. § 919(c) ("The [Director] shall make or cause to be made
such investigations as he considers necessary in respect of the
claim, and upon application of any interested party shall order a
hearing thereon . . . .") (emphasis added); 20 C.F.R. §725.421(a)
("In any claim for which a formal hearing is requested . . ., the
[Director] shall refer the claim to the Office of Administrative
Law Judges for a hearing.") (emphasis added).
We are unaware of any mandatory requirements as to the form
that an appeal must take, other than that it be in writing.

Nor

has the Director apprised us of any such requisites with which
Plesh has failed to comply.

Hence, we conclude that Plesh's
15

handwritten note constituted a request for a formal hearing
before an ALJ, triggering the Director's duty to refer all
contested issues to an ALJ for resolution.
The Director argues, however, that Plesh's request for
review of the decision to terminate his benefits was ineffective
because Plesh made the request prior to the entry of a final
order.

In support of this contention, the Director cites several

regulatory provisions, including section 725.450, which provides:
Any party to a claim . . . shall have a right to a
hearing concerning any contested issue of fact or law
unresolved by the [Director]. There shall be no right
to a hearing until the processing and adjudication of
the claim by the [Director] has been completed. There
shall be no right to a hearing in a claim with respect
to which a determination of the claim made by the
[Director] has become final and effective in accordance
with this part.
20 C.F.R. § 725.450.
The Director also relies on section 725.419(a), which
provides in part:
Within 30 days after the date of issuance of a proposed
decision and order, any party may, in writing, request
a revision of the proposed decision and order or a
hearing. If a hearing is requested, the [Director]
shall refer the claim to the Office of Administrative
Law Judges.
Id. at § 725.419(a).

The Director also points to the Secretary's

comments reported in the Federal Register:
One comment recommends that the [Director] should be
required to terminate the processing of a claim as soon
as a hearing is requested, and immediately forward the
claim for a hearing.
. . . .
. . . A party should not be allowed to proceed to a
hearing before informal procedures are completed. It
is not appropriate for a hearing to go forward until
the issues are fully identified and most evidentiary
16

development completed. These preliminary activities
are within the purview of the [Director], and not the
[ALJ].
43 Fed. Reg. 36,797 (Aug. 18, 1978).
The Director posits that a claimant cannot exercise his or
her right to a hearing until after a final determination has been
made as to the claimant's entitlement to benefits.

We agree that

a claimant is not entitled to a hearing until after the Director
has "completed development and adjudication [of claimant's
application for benefits]."

20 C.F.R. § 725.421(a).

That is, a

formal hearing may not be conducted until after the Director has
made an initial finding as to the claimant's eligibility for
black lung benefits.
Nevertheless, we cannot agree that a premature appeal (that
is, a hearing request filed before entry of a final order) is
ineffective as an invocation of a claimant's right to a hearing
before an ALJ.

Notably, none of the regulations cited by the

Director forbid a claimant from requesting a hearing prior to
entry of a final order; they merely indicate that the claimant
cannot "proceed to a hearing before informal procedures are
completed."

43 Fed. Reg. 36, 797 (Aug. 18, 1978).

The Director argues that Plesh was required to take some
further action after, but within thirty days of, receiving the
Proposed Decision and Order.

Plesh's failure to file a second

request for a hearing, according to the Director, was fatal.
The Director further suggests that the Notice of Appeal
Rights, which was included with the Proposed Decision and Order,
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should have alerted Plesh to the necessity of submitting a
written request for a hearing.

The notice advised that

"[f]ailure to appeal with [sic] that thirty (30) day period will
result in the Order becoming final . . . ."
However, Plesh explained, during the hearing before the ALJ,
that the reason he took no further action (after receiving the
Proposed Decision and Order and the Notice of Appeal Rights) was
that he believed he had already appealed the termination of his
benefits by his letter, which stated "I am appealing this [order]
as of now."

The ALJ found Plesh's testimony on this issue to be

credible.
It is easy to understand how Plesh, who was not represented
by counsel at the time the Director advised him that his award
was under reconsideration, could be confused as to the proper
protocol for appealing the order which terminated his benefits.
The Proposed Decision and Order bears a striking resemblance to
the Order to Show Cause.

The first four paragraphs of each

document are identical; and both are printed on DOL letterhead.
The only significant difference between the two documents was
that the final order was captioned "Proposed Decision and Order
of Modification of Award of Benefit" rather than "Order to Show
Cause."

However, a layperson might well fail to discern the

legal distinction between an Order to Show Cause and a Proposed
Decision and Order.
The Director cites a litany of cases for the proposition
that an appeal from an order to show cause is premature because
the order to show cause is not a final order.
18

The Director,

however, never responded to Plesh's counter-argument that a
premature request for a hearing can be perfected by the
subsequent entry of a final order.
Indeed, we have taken such an approach in the context of
premature filings of notices of appeal to this court.

We have

held that an appeal from "an order which is not final but which
is followed by an order that is final may be regarded as an
appeal from the final order in the absence of a showing of
prejudice to the other party."

Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918,

922 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698
F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1983); New Castle County v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1178 (3d Cir. 1991);
Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 138 (3d Cir.
1988); Hodge v. Hodge, 507 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1975).

Our own

appellate rules of procedure, which pertain to certain
postjudgment motions, have always provided jurisdictional
deadlines.

Yet, even these rules have recently been amended, see

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2) (as amended Apr. 22, 1993, effective Dec.
1, 1993), to provide for a premature filing of a notice of
appeal.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2) explicitly

provides that "[a] notice of appeal filed after the court
announces a decision or order but before the entry of the
judgment or order is treated as filed on the date of and after
the entry."
We have been given no reason to hold that a premature
request for a hearing should be treated differently than a
premature appeal from the decision of a district court.
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Plesh's

letter "appealing" from the Order to Show Cause rather than from
the subsequent final order will accordingly be deemed filed as of
the date the Director's final order was entered.

In our view,

such a rule does not prejudice the Director.
We therefore conclude that the BRB erred in determining that
Plesh had not appealed the 1987 modification of his first claim.
In light of our conclusion that Plesh's first claim was still
pending, we hold that the ALJ properly merged Plesh's second
filed claim with his earlier first claim and hence properly
determined that Plesh's claim for benefits should be evaluated
under the interim presumptions of Part 727.
V.
We next turn to the ALJ's analysis under Part 727.

Under 20

C.F.R. § 727.203(a), a claimant may invoke the presumption of
entitlement to benefits if the claimant has been engaged in coal
mine employment for at least ten years and the claimant satisfies
at least one of five medical requirements.0

Based upon the

Director's stipulation and Plesh's Social Security record, the
ALJ credited Plesh with seventeen and three-fourth years of coal
mine employment.

This finding is supported by substantial

credible evidence.
The ALJ found that the x-ray and arterial blood gas study
evidence insufficient to satisfy the requirements under sections
727.203(a)(1) and (a)(3).

On the other hand, the ALJ found that

the interim presumption could be invoked based on the pulmonary

0

See supra note 14 for the text of section 727.203(a).
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function study and medical opinion evidence pursuant to
subsections (a)(2) and (a)(4).

Based on our review of the

record, we conclude that the ALJ's finding that Plesh satisfied
subsections (a)(2) and (a)(4) is supported by substantial
evidence.
To invoke the presumption based on ventilatory study results
under section 727.203(a)(2), a claimant who is less than 67
inches tall must demonstrate FEV1 (forced expiratory volume)
values equal to or less than 2.3 liters per second and MVV
(maximum voluntary ventilation) values equal to or less than 92
liters per minute.

Plesh, who is 5' 4" tall, see Jt. App. 380,

underwent ventilatory study testing on five occasions, from
December 1979 to July 1989.

The ALJ found that the FEV1 values

ranged from 1.33 to 1.92; and the MVV values ranged from 42 to
59.

Jt. App. 102.

Therefore, Plesh was entitled to invoke the

presumption under subsection (a)(2).
To invoke the presumption under subsection (a)(4), a
claimant may establish the presence of a totally disabling
respiratory or pulmonary impairment through "[o]ther medical
evidence, including the documented opinion of a physician
exercising reasoned medical judgment . . . ."
§ 727.203(a)(4).

20 C.F.R.

The ALJ relied on the reports of Drs. Young and

Witorsch to conclude that Plesh had established a totally
disabling respiratory impairment within the meaning of the BLBA.
Dr. Young, who had examined Plesh in May 1980, concluded that
Plesh suffered from a moderate respiratory disability.

Dr.

Witorsch, who examined Plesh in July 1989, characterized Plesh's
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respiratory impairment as mild but agreed that Plesh's
respiratory impairment would prevent him from performing heavy
manual labor as required in coal mine employment.

These medical

reports constitute substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's
finding that Plesh could invoke the presumption under subsection
(a)(4).
Once a claimant has successfully invoked the interim
presumption under section 727.203(a), as Plesh did under
subsections (a)(2) and (a)(4), the burden of production and
persuasion shifts to the Director to rebut the presumption in one
of the four methods set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b).

The ALJ

found that the Director had failed to rebut the presumption under
subsections (b)(1), (b)(2) or (b)(4).

Substantial evidence

supports the ALJ's determination with respect to the Director's
burden of rebuttal under these subsections.0

0

Under subsection (b)(1), the Director may rebut the presumption
by proving that the claimant is in fact engaged in his usual coal
mine work or comparable and gainful work. The record reveals
that Plesh has not worked in a coal mine since 1966; indeed, the
Director does not contend that rebuttal is established under this
subsection.
Under subsection (b)(2), the Director may rebut the
presumption if the evidence establishes that the claimant is
capable of performing his usual coal mine work or comparable and
gainful work. Dr. Witorsch found that Plesh was unable to engage
in heavy manual labor because of his respiratory condition; and
the Director did not offer any evidence to the contrary.
Under subsection (b)(4), the interim presumption may be
rebutted by establishing that the claimant does not have
pneumoconiosis. First, there is record evidence to support a
finding that Plesh suffers from pneumoconiosis; for example, Dr.
Young read Plesh's x-rays as positive for pneumoconiosis.
Moreover, the Director relies solely on the reports of Drs.
Witorsch and Corazza to establish rebuttal under this subsection.
Neither report, however, is sufficient to establish rebuttal.
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As to subsection (b)(3), however, the ALJ found that the
Director had established that Plesh's disability did not arise,
in whole or in part, out of coal mine employment.

Under Third

Circuit precedents, in order to rebut a presumption of
pneumoconiosis under subsection (b)(3), the party opposing the
award of benefits must "'rule out' a possible causal connection
between a miner's disability and his coal mine employment." Kline
v. Director, OWCP, 877 F.2d 1175, 1179 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis
original).

In ruling that the Director had met her burden of

rebutting the presumption under subsection (b)(3), the ALJ relied
entirely on Dr. Witorsch's testimony.
We cannot agree that Dr. Witorsch's testimony "rules out" a
possible causal connection between Plesh's disability and his
employment as a coal mine worker.

Dr. Witorsch never

First, Dr. Witorsch's findings were equivocal. Indeed, he
concluded that Plesh's x-rays were "consistent" with
pneumoconiosis and that pulmonary function studies showed some
mild restrictive pulmonary condition. Dr. Witorsch merely noted
that a lateral x-ray and additional lung volume tests were
necessary for a conclusive determination as to the presence of
pneumoconiosis.
Second, Dr. Corazza's opinion was based solely on the fact
that "[t]here is no evidence of pneumoconiosis on the x-ray." Jt.
App. 378. As noted by the Supreme Court, however, "significant
evidence demonstrat[es] that x-ray testing that fails to disclose
pneumoconiosis cannot be depended upon as a trustworthy indicator
of the absence of the disease." Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co., 428 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1976). The ALJ properly discounted Dr.
Corazza's opinion as inconsistent with the BLBA because the
statute "specifically provides that a presumption of
pneumoconiosis comes into play even though it cannot be proved by
x-ray." Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. v. Benefits Review Bd.,
758 F.2d 1532, 1534 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that ALJ properly
refused to accredit opinion of physician who stated that he would
not diagnose pneumoconiosis absent positive x-ray evidence that
the disease existed).
23

affirmatively stated that Plesh's coal mine employment did not
contribute to his disability.

Rather Dr. Witorsch merely

expressed his reservations about diagnosing the cause of Plesh's
chronic respiratory disease with any degree of medical certainty.
Dr. Witorsch's deposition testimony is enlightening:
Q: [D]o you believe that Mr. Plesh has a chronic
lung disease significantly related to or substantially
aggravated by coal dust exposure?
A: I'm not certain that he does. He has a
chronic lung disease but I can't say with any degree of
medical certainty that it relates to his coal dust
exposure.
. . . .
Q: Is that statement [in Dr. Diggs's medical
report] consistent with a chronic lung disease
significantly related to or substantially aggravated by
coal dust exposure?
A: It is consistent with it but not diagnostic of
it. . . . [W]e'd need at least a lateral x-ray [to
make such a diagnosis].
. . . .
Q: Are these findings [in your July 5 report]
consistent with a chronic lung disease significantly
related to or substantially aggravated by coal dust
exposure?
A: Again, they are consistent with it but not
diagnostic of it. . . .
. . . .
Q: Does Mr. Plesh's history of coal dust exposure
support a determination that he has a coal dust related
impairment?
A: I think it neither supports it or refutes it.
It is consistent with his -- at least it indicates that
he had exposure but it's only supportive in the sense
that if he never worked in a coal mine or never had any
exposure, it would be very inconsistent with that.
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. . . .
Q: Can you rule out the causal contribution of
the restrictive impairment to his lung impairment?
A: Well, I think if he has any, it's at most,
very slight and I think he probably doesn't have any.
And the reason I say that is his predominant impairment
is air flow obstruction . . . . So, any contribution
of any restrictive impairment would be negligible to
very small.
. . . .
Q:

You say the contribution is uncertain?

A: It -- I couldn't be a hundred percent certain
from a scientific point of view.
Q: Okay, so forgive me if I'm trying to -- I
don't want to put words in your mouth but I want you to
address specifically, can you rule out the causal
contribution?
A: I cannot absolutely rule it out with this
information [i.e. without further tests].
Jt. App. 271-79.
Dr. Witorsch's testimony cannot be read to "rule out" coal
workers' pneumoconiosis as a contributing factor to Plesh's
disability.

Rather, Dr. Witorsch merely stated that he could not

confirm the extent to which pneumoconiosis contributed to Plesh's
respiratory ailment.

In fact, Dr. Witorsch, on several

occasions, opined that the medical evidence was consistent with
coal workers' pneumoconiosis.
We were faced with a similar set of facts in Kline v.
Director, OWCP, 877 F.2d 1175 (3d Cir. 1989).

In that case, the

ALJ found that the claimant had established the presumption under
section 727.203(a).

However, the ALJ concluded that the

presumption was rebutted under subsections (b)(3) and (b)(4)
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based upon the testimony of Dr. McQuillan.

Id. at 1177.

Dr.

McQuillan reviewed the medical records and concluded that the
miner's pulmonary condition was due to advanced tuberculosis,
stating that he was "unable to substantiate a disabling diagnosis
of pneumoconiosis in this case."

Id. at 1178.

The BRB affirmed,

finding that the ALJ had "properly credited the opinion of Dr.
McQuillen [sic]."

Id. at 1177.

We reversed, holding that Dr. McQuillan's opinion was
insufficient to rebut the presumption.

We explained that "Dr.

McQuillan's strongest statement is that he was not able to
substantiate a diagnosis of pneumoconiosis.

The fact that Dr.

McQuillan could not confirm pneumoconiosis does not suggest that
such a condition is inconsistent with the medical evidence."

Id.

at 1179.
Similarly, in the case at bar, Dr. Witorsch's testimony that
he could not conclude with any degree of medical certainty that
Plesh's condition was caused by coal dust exposure does not
establish the lack of a causal connection.

Indeed, Dr. Witorsch

requested the DOL's permission to perform additional tests
(lateral x-rays and lung volume tests) to ascertain whether
Plesh's chronic respiratory problems were related to coal dust
exposure.

Dr. Witorsch's request was denied, and the record does

not reveal the reasons for the denial.

However, the fact that

Dr. Witorsch requested these tests indicates at the very least
that Dr. Witorsch was uncertain as to whether Plesh suffered from
pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment.
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Therefore, we conclude that the ALJ's finding of rebuttal
under subsection (b)(3) is not supported by substantial evidence.
The interim presumption under section 727.203(a) consequently
remains unrebutted.

Thus, Plesh is entitled to benefits under

the BLBA.
VI.
In sum, we conclude that the record establishes Plesh's
entitlement to black lung benefits as a matter of law.

We will

therefore reverse the BRB's decision and order and remand this
case solely for reinstatement of Plesh's benefits, which had been
erroneously terminated.
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